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INTRODUCTION

INtriesTHEhaveSEARCH
for alternative energy sources, many counturned to harnessing wind power

as a clean source
of renewable
While onshore wind farms have been
sited in various states, the United States lags behind foreign
countries such as Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom,2 and
China3 in establishing offshore wind farms. But it has not been
energy.1

for lack of trying.4 Many anticipated that the Cape Wind project, slated for construction in Nantucket Sound, would become
the first offshore wind farm in the United States. 5 However, the
project has been plagued by litigation since 2002.6 In October
2011, opponents of the Cape Wind project won one battle in
their war to permanently ground the project when the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) vacated a
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) "no hazard" determination in relation to the project as arbitrary and capricious for failure to follow its own internal guidelines.7 This was the first legal
victory for the opposition in a string of unsuccessful lawsuits designed to block the project's construction. 8
l Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting
Wind Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 327-29 (2011).
2 Michael Schulz, Questions Blowing in the Wind: The Development of Offshore Wind
as a Renewable Source of Energy in the United States, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 415, 417-18
(2003).
-1 PR China, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL (GWEC), http://www.gwec.net/
index.php?id=125 (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
4 See, e.g., Map of Offshore Wind Energy Activity in North America, OFFSHOREWIND.
NET, http://offshorewind.net/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (listing "major active projects" in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey).
5 See Schulz, supra note 2, at 416, 421-22.
6 Lisa Wing Stone & Sara Zdeb, Lessons Learnedfrom Wind Farm Litigation,ABA
ENVrL. LITIG. & Toxic TORTS COMm. NEWSL., Mar. 2009, at 5 n.3. "
7 Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. FAA, 659 F.3d 28, 30-31, 34-36 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
[hereinafter BarnstableI].
8 Id. at 36; see, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of
the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding summary judgment
for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the basis that the Corps complied with
legal obligations in granting a permit to build an offshore data tower in Nantucket Sound); Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 791 (Mass. 2010) [hereinafter Alliance I1] (affirming the
siting board's decision to grant a "certificate of environmental impact and public
interest"); Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting
Bd., 858 N.E.2d 294, 295 (Mass. 2006) [hereinafter Alliance 1] (affirming the siting board's decision to conditionally approve construction of underground transmission lines); Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. Cape Wind Assocs., LLC, 27 Mass. L.
Rptr. 111, 2010 WL 2436837, at *1, *13, *15 (Super. Ct. 2010) (finding issuance
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The Cape Wind story offers a dramatic example of the
gridlock that occurs when two evenly matched opponents, both
deeply committed to their diametrically opposed viewpoints, single-mindedly pursue their goals. In fact, the story is so dramatic
that it attracted the attention of filmmakers and ultimately
spawned a movie, "Cape Spin! An American Power Struggle."9
While the film may be part "comic," the issues surrounding the
Cape Wind permitting process and the high costs" of lobbying
and litigation are not.
If one opposes offshore wind development" or fears that a
streamlined process will fail to adequately weigh the impacts of a
particular project, then an inability to adequately study the
problem, bring together the stakeholders, and establish a working statutory scheme may be welcome. But if one supports the
12
development of offshore wind, as have our past two Presidents,
then continuing down the path blazed by Cape Wind is unacceptable. Even those who remain ambivalent as to whether the
government should focus its resources on pursuing offshore
wind energy may care about reforming the process simply because of the large-scale investment of both private capital and
tax dollars spent on regulatory review and litigation related to
13
the siting process.
Other authors have proposed passing new, comprehensive4
legislation to overhaul the current, complex statutory regime,'
of a Final Environmental Impact Report Certificate for the wind farm was not
arbitrary and capricious).
9 See CAPE SPIN! AN AMERICAN PoWER STRUGGLE (Rebirth Prods. 2011), available athttp://www.capespin.com/about-cape-spin/ (trailer describing the film as a
"surreal, fascinating, tragicomic story of the battle over America's most controversial clean energy project . . . 'a gripping and entertaining study of eco-capitalism
and grassroots democracy"').
10 See infra text accompanying notes 81, 83, 86.
11See infra Part II(C) (noting that the most vocal opponents of Cape Wind
support some form of wind energy).
12 See infra note 19 (mentioning former President Bush's support of wind
farms); infra note 65 (showing President Obama's support of offshore wind).
The support of two consecutive Presidents with different political ideologies may
be indicative of broad citizen support of wind power as one source of clean, renewable energy, despite a lack of consensus on where commercial wind farms
should be sited. See id.
13 See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., GregoryJ. Rigano, Note, The Solution to the United States'Energy Troubles is Blowing in the Wind, 39 HOFSTRA L. REv. 201, 232-38 (2011) (proposing an
"Offshore Wind Energy Act" to simplify the current regulatory scheme).
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or amending current legislation" to expedite the permitting
process. Proposing a comprehensive solution to the regulatory
woes encountered in offshore wind permitting is beyond the
scope of this comment. Rather, this comment limits its focus to
the role the FAA has played in the Cape Wind saga and what the
FAA can do within the current framework, as well as proposes
incremental steps to facilitate the process of getting offshore
wind off the ground.
First, Part II examines the historical backdrop of offshore
commercial wind farm development that is necessary to understand how the developments in the Cape Wind project, particularly those concerning the FAA, fit into the broader picture.
Next, Part II discusses the impetus for developing offshore wind
as part of the nation's overall renewable energy plan and
presents a high-level overview of the potential and problems
generally associated with developing offshore wind. Then, Part
II discusses the Cape Wind project specifically, including its opponents, its proponents, and the litigation history leading up to
the Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. FAA (Barnstable I1)16 decision.
Further, Part II concludes with a brief, comparative look at the
development of offshore wind in other nations, with an emphasis on the United Kingdom. Part III presents the current state of
the law, beginning with the regulatory framework for obtaining
a lease and wind farm permit. Most of Part III discusses the
Barnstable H case, and the section ends with a discussion of the
United Kingdoms's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Policy and
Guidelines on Wind Turbines. 17 Finally, Part IV analyzes the
"Smart from the Start" implementation, discusses the judicial review of the FAA's "no hazard" determination, and proposes future actions for the FAA in light of the October 2011 vacate-andremand order. The focus of this comment is on solutions that
can be implemented based on and within the existing legal and
statutory framework to facilitate-rather than hinder-offshore
wind farm development.
15 See, e.g., Kenneth Kimmell & Dawn Stolfi Stalenhoef, The Cape Wind Offshore
Wind Energy Project: A Case Study of the Difficult Transition to Renewable Energy, 5
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. LJ. 197, 212-15 (2011) (proposing reforms to the federal permitting process based on changes that have been made to Massachusetts
law); Erica Schroeder, Turning Offshore Wind On, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1660-64
(2010) (suggesting revisions to the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) to
facilitate offshore wind energy development).
16 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
17 CIVL AVIATION AUTH., CAP 764: CAA POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR WIND TURBINES (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/Cap764.pdf.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although domestic onshore electricity production via wind
energy dates back to 1887, modern commercial wind turbines
were first installed in California a century later.' The past two
Presidents, though motivated by different political ideologies,
have both supported increasing domestically produced renewable energy technologies, including wind energy.'9 Until 2010,
the United States had been the leader in wind energy capacityall via land-based wind turbines. 2 However, in 2010, China re21
placed the United States as the leader in installed capacity.
Currently, the United Kingdom leads the world in the offshore
wind energy market, with Denmark following. 22 Although the
United States has significant wind resources available offshore,
those resources remain untapped. 2 For the past decade, developers have attempted to acquire the requisite permits to construct and operate offshore wind farms, 24 yet not one
operational commercial offshore wind farm exists in the United
States.

A.

THE POTENTIAL OF OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) encourages the development of wind energy to realize environmental, economic, and
Schroeder, supra note 15, at 1635.
See Brian Merchant, Meet Wind Power's New Spokesman: George W Bush?,
TREEHUGGER (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/meet-wind-powers-new-spokesman-george-w-bush.html (noting that although
former President Bush established laws conducive to wind energy development
when he was Governor of Texas, as President he did not pass similar laws even
though he recognized the potential of wind energy); see also infra note 65 (discussing President Obama's support of wind energy).
20 See United States, GVEC, http://wv.gwec.net/index.php?id=121
(last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (noting that after the United States set a record for wind
installations in 2009, it failed to maintain its status in 2010).
21 See id. (stating that by year-end 2010, China had the largest installed
capacity).
22 See EU Offshore, GWEC, http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=172 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2012).
23 See Matthew L. Wald, Offshore Wind Is a Bit Closer, Backers Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 13, 2011, 7:15 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/offshore-wind-is-inching-closer-backers-say/ (crediting Interior Secretary Salazar for
noting that our offshore potential exceeds current onshore capacity, yet "we have
zero offshore wind generating capacity to date-zero").
24 See Karen Lee Ziner, Offshore Harvest of Wind Is Proposedfor Cape Cod, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at F3 (the Cape Wind project has been in the works since
2002).
18
19

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

610

energy goals. 25 Chief among those goals is energy diversification
in clean technologies that leads to greenhouse gas emission reductions. 26 The DOE estimates that within the next twenty
years, 20% of the country's electricity could be supplied by wind
energy. This fits into the aggressive presidential goal of using
clean energy to supply 80% of our national electricity consumption by 2035.28 Offshore wind energy production would move
the nation toward that goal because offshore wind energy emits
no carbon dioxide.2 9 In fact, the DOE and the Department of
the Interior (DOI) have estimated that in terms of greenhouse
gas emission reductions, for every one gigawatt of offshore wind
capacity that replaces the equivalent amount of fossil fuel-powered electricity, the country could realize an annual reduction
in over 2.5 million tons of C02 emissions.30 Additionally, offshore wind energy generation could diminish water pollution.'
In addition to the environmental gains from using offshore
wind to power electricity, the nation could realize valuable economic gains by pursuing offshore wind energy. One significant
gain includes scaling back both U.S. reliance on foreign oil and
its associated importation and political costs. 3 2 These costs include not only the direct cost of oil, but also the resulting im-3
pacts that rising oil prices have on the U.S. economy.
Additionally, at least one author has proposed that shifting the
source of the electricity supply to wind power could save the
high costs of cleaning up domestic oil spills, such as the cost
resulting from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska and the
2010 British Petroleum (BP) spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 4 The
25 See Wind Program: Offshore Wind Technology, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://
wwwl.eere.energy.gov/wind/offshorewind.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
26 See id.
27 Building a New Energy Future with Wind Power, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Aug.
2011), http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/ind/pdfs/eere.wind water.pdf.
28 JACQUES BEAUDRY-LOSIQUE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR,

A

NATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY: CREATING AN OFFSHORE WIND

(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://
wwwl .eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/national-offshore-wind-strategy.pdf.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 6.
31 See Schulz, supra note 2, at 419-20.
32 See id. at 419.
ENERGY INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 5

33 See Rigano, supra note 14, at 204-06 (citing war costs, decreased GDP, in-

creased price of consumer goods, lower employment, and recession as indirect
economic costs of rising oil prices).
34 See id. at 207-10, 212-13.
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Exxon Valdez spill cost approximately $3.5 billion to clean up,35
and at the time this comment was written, BP had already spent
$14 billion in cleanup costs.36
Although some opponents of offshore wind projects support
land-based wind energy facilities as an alternative to offshore
wind, 7 that view may fail to consider several important factors
that make offshore wind development attractive. Offshore wind
offers a comparative advantage over land-based wind due to its
relative strength and consistency.38 Additionally, offshore wind
farms could be sited near the areas of greatest electricity demand. 9 Further, because of the finite nature of land, its availability for wind farm development is inversely related to
population and the construction of other developments, increasing the challenge of siting future large-scale, land-based
wind farms." The finite availability of land may be particularly
a wind farm as
important given the land area required to site
41
compared to that required by a power plant.

B.

THE PROBLEM WITH OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY

Not everyone agrees that the potential benefits of wind energy
delivered via commercial wind farms, whether onshore or offshore, are worth pursuing.4 2 One land use and environmental
35 Shelley DuBois, 6 Big Oil Spills, and What They Cost, CNNMoNEY (May 19,
2010, 12:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/fortune/1005/gallery.expensive-oil-spills.fortune/2.html (noting that when adjusted for inflation,
the cost was $6.3 billion in 2010 dollars).
36 BP Seeks Spill Costsfrom Halliburton,GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2012, 3:15 AM), http:/
/www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/an/3/bp-seeks-spill-costs-halliburton.
37 See Better Choices, ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTUCKET SOUND, http://www.
saveoursound.org/alternativestocape-wind/better .choices/ (last visited Sept.
1, 2012) (listing deeper water wind sites as an alternative to the Cape Wind project); Deirdre Fulton, The Winds of War: The Battle over the Nantucket Sound Wind
Farm, BOSTON PHOENIX (July 15-21, 2005), http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news features/top/features/documents/04823490.asp ("The Alliance supports wind power as an energy source.").
38 BEAUDRY-LosIQUE ET AL., supra note 28, at 6.
39 See id. ("The 28 coastal and Great Lakes states in the continental United
States use 78% of the nation's electricity.").
40 Schulz, supra note 2, at 418-19.
41 See Stone & Zdeb, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that "siting [a wind farm] requires an especially large footprint").
42 See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and NIMBYS: Generating Conflict,
Reducing Litigation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 427, 441-43 (2010) (noting residents and environmentalists opposed a proposed farm in Nevada on multiple
grounds, including noise, impact on property values, aesthetics, and threats to
birds).
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lawyer has highlighted several problems associated with delivering wind energy on this scale." Adverse environmental impacts
resulting from commercial wind farms include habitat destruction or alteration, death of bats and birds, as well as noise and
light pollution.44 The turbines also disrupt a variety of communication signals, thus impacting devices used for both personal
and defense purposes. 45 Critics also question whether established onshore wind farms are actually delivering the promised
environmental gains.46 Several factors have invited this criticism: the disconnect between the timing of the demand for electricity and the availability of wind-generated power, the necessity
of backup power generators, the level of greenhouse gas emissions during the construction of a commercial wind farm, and
the disturbing instances where existing transmission lines are insufficient to accept and deliver the electricity produced by wind
farms.4 7 Perhaps one of the most disturbing criticisms involves
the cost of commercial wind farms, with a significant source of
revenue-more than half, by some estimates-coming in the
form of government assistance.48
C.

WHAT IS CAPE WIND?

In 2002, Cape Wind, a project of Energy Management Inc.
(EMI) and Wind Management Inc., proposed to erect 170 turbines in Horseshoe Shoal near the center of Nantucket Sound;
the offshore wind farm would be called Cape Wind.49 Project
developers have since reduced the number of turbines to 130. 5°
Nantucket Sound lies between Cape Cod, Massachusetts,
43 See Gary A. Abraham, Inconvenient Truths About Wind Energy: Representing
Neighbors and Communities Impacted by Commercial Wind Projects, N.Y. ZONING L. &

PRAc. REP. 1 (Mar./Apr. 2010), availableat http://Av.garyabraham.com/files/
wind/WINDENERGY.NYZoning-andPlanningLawRep4.pdf.
44
45

Id. at 3.
Id.

46 Id.

47 Id. at 4-6 (noting that one large wind farm in New York was shut down even
when capable of producing energy because the transmission lines lacked capacity
to handle the supply).
48 Id. at 1-3 ("Utility-scale wind projects enjoy a -164% tax rate[, and] . . . a
wind farm that generates 20 megawatts on average [annually] ... receives over $4
million in federal assistance, or more than half the revenue received from sales of
electricity.").
49 Ziner, supra note 24.
50 Frequently Asked Questions, CAPE WIND, http://capewind.org/FAQ-Category4Cape+Wind+Basics-Parent0-myfaq-yes.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
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Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket. 5 1 Cape Wind chose this site
near Cape Cod because it offered what they considered an ideal
mix of desirable factors, including water depth, distance to land,
reliable winds, and minimal impact on commercial shipping
and boating.5 2 The turbines would rise approximately 440 feet
above the water, with a distance between each structure of
roughly .34 to .54 nautical miles.5" Cape Wind would lie approximately five to fourteen miles from land, depending on whether
one measures the distance to Cape Cod or to one of the islands. 54 Upon completion, the wind farm would cover approximately twenty-five square miles, or approximately one-sixth of
55
Nantucket Sound.
Project stakeholders anticipate that the wind farm would, on
average, produce enough electricity to supply 75% of the electricity demands on the islands and Cape Cod. 56 Further, stakeholders anticipate that when the farm operates at its peak, it
would produce nearly 2.5 times that amount of electricity."
Cape Wind estimates that the project could reduce oil consumption by over 100 million gallons of oil annually. 58 By early 2010,
an estimated $45 million of private capital had been spent on
the Cape Wind project, yet turbine construction had not even
begun.59
A myriad of actors have inserted themselves or been drawn
into the Cape Wind drama. Jim Gordon, Cape Wind's CEO and
staunchest supporter, established EMI as an independent en51 See The Sound, ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTUCKET SOUND,
http://wwwv.
saveoursound.org/nantucket-sound/the-sound (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
52 Project Siting and Visual Simulations, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/
article7.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
53 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 50 (describing the wind turbines' placement as between six and nine football fields apart).
54 Id. ("Cape Wind will be farther away from the nearest home than any other
electricity generation facility in Massachusetts.").
55 BarnstableII, 659 F.3d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011); The Sound, supra note 51 (stating that the total area of Nantucket Sound is "163 square nautical miles").
56 Press Release, Cape Wind, Independent Experts Agree, Cape Wind's Electricity Will Power Cape & Islands and Reduce Pollution and Energy Prices (June
3, 2002), available at http://www.capewind.org/modules.php?op=modload&
name=News&file=article&sid=81&mode=mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.
57 See id. (estimating the project's average production at 170 megawatts and its
peak production at 430 megawatts of electricity).
58 Project at a Glance, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/modules.phpop=
modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=24&page=1
(last
visited Sept. 1, 2012).
5," Editorial, Cape Windbags, WALL ST.J., Apr. 30, 2010, at A16 (noting the funds
were expended on regulatory- and litigation-related costs).
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ergy company in the 1970s. 60 In 2001, Gordon sold EMI and
concentrated his efforts on Cape Wind's development.6 Supporters of the project have included Massachusetts Governor
Deval Patrick 62 and multiple organizations, including Clean
Power Now 63 and Greenpeace. 6 4 Additionally, President Obama

has endorsed wind farms generally as one piece in the overall
plan to meet the nation's renewable energy and environmental
goals;6 5 in fact, his administration has attempted to aid in at
least one dispute that arose with Cape Wind.66
Multiple individuals and organizations have opposed the
Cape Wind project. The loudest united voice of opposition belongs to the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (Alliance).67
Irate property owners established the Alliance as a non-profit
organization to defeat the Cape Wind project and preserve the
Sound.6 8 One of the Alliance's largest financial supporters is
Bill Koch, a "fossil fuel magnate."69 Early in the review process,
both Attorney General Thomas Riley and Senator William Dela60 Wayne Drash, The Wind Man Who Beat Cape Cod's Elite, CNN TECH (Apr.29,
2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/201O/TECH/04/29/cape.wind.ceo.pro
file/?hpt=C2.
61 Id.
62 See Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 15, at 207.
63 Clean Power Now disbanded at the end of 2011. See Sean Corcoran, Sean
Corcoran's Cape Wind Blog, WCAI (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.wgbh.org/wcai/
cape wind-blog.cfm.
64 Drash, supra note 60.
65 See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Background on the President's
Town Hall at the Gamesa Plant in Fair Hills, Pennsylvania (Apr. 6, 2011), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011 /04/06/background-president-s-town-hall-gamesa-plant-fair-hills-pennsylvania; Press Release, The White
House, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address (The President said in his 2011 State of the Union
address, "By 2035, [80%] of America's electricity will come from clean energy
sources. Some folks want wind and solar. Others want nuclear, clean coal and
natural gas. To meet this goal, we will need them all.").
66 SeeJuliet Eilperin, Wind Farm Off Massachusetts Meets Strong Resistance; White
House Trying to End Fight Over Project That Faces Criticism, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2010,
at A4 (discussing Interior Secretary Salazar's February 2010 trip to Nantucket to
attempt to meet with Native American tribes who opposed the Cape Wind project
on both cultural and historic grounds).
67 See Patrick Cassidy, Cape Wind Farm Backers to Fold, CAPECODONLINE (Dec.
23, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID
=/20111223/NEWS/1 12230317/-I/SPECIALO1.
68 See About Us, ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTUCKET SOUND, http://www.saveoursound.org/about.Us/mission/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
69 See Michael Rezendes, Once-Mighty Wind Farm Foe Falls into Debt, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2010, at 1.

20121

GROUNDING THE CAPE WND PROJECT

615

hunt championed a suspension of the process until changes in
the federal regulatory scheme were made. v° Other notable political project opponents include Mitt Romney, former Massachusetts Governor and the 2012 Republican presidential
nominee, and the late Senator Edward Kennedy.7
Although both Cape Wind and the Alliance agree that wind
energy provides a desirable source of clean energy,72 they agree
on little else. Project developers assert "[t]he slender supporting towers will be painted to blend in with the horizon, making
them visible one half-inch above the horizon on clear days."7 3
However, the Alliance claims the project will negatively impact
the view at all times.7 4 Both positions have credence and depend on seemingly irreconcilable perspectives.75 Additionally,
project proponents and opponents hotly contest the costs and
benefits of Cape Wind.76 In addition to believing the wind farm
to be an alternative clean energy source, Cape Wind believes the
project will boost the Cape's economic health through increased jobs and tourism. 77 The Alliance takes the opposite view
and sees the project as negatively impacting not only the economy but also the environment and public safety. 78 Specifically,
70

See Schulz, supra note 2, at 424.

71 See Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 15, at 201, 206.
72 Compare The True Cost of Electricity, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/
article32.htm ("Wind stands out as the energy source that best balances environment, health and economics-it is a true alternative for cost-effective energy."),
with Fulton, supra note 37 ("The Alliance supports wind power as an alternative
energy source.").
73 Project Siting and Visual Simulations, supra note 52.
74 View, ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTUCKET SOUND, http://www.saveoursound.
org/capewind-threats/view/ (stating that "the Cape Wind project would be
highly visible both day and night from Cape Cod and from the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard. The plant would dramatically alter the natural
landscape and negatively impact several historic landmarks.").
75 This is the author's view. To view pictorial simulations of the proposed wind
farm, see the websites listed supra notes 52 and 74.
76 See, e.g., Jay Lindsay, Filmmakers Take on Cape Wind Saga in "Cape Spin",
MASSLIVE.COM (Aug. 1, 2011, 6:51 AM), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.
ssf/2011/08/filmmakerstake-on-capewind s.html. Compare Cape Wind Environmental Studies, CAPE WIND, http://capewind.org/article38.htm (last visited
Sept. 1, 2012), with Cape Wind Threats: The Environment, ALLIANCE TO PROTECT
NANTUCKET SOUND, http://www.saveoursound.org/cape-wind threats/environment/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
77 Boosting Cape Cod's Economy, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/article2.
htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
78 See Cape Wind Threats: The Environment, supra note 76; Economic Boondoggle,
ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTUCKET SOUND, http://www.saveoursound.org/capewind threats/economy/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012); Cape Wind Threats: Public
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opponents expect a negative impact on tourism directly related
to the wind farm's degradation of the scenic views on the Cape
and the islands.7 1 Opponents also see the turbines as threatening the safety of boats and aircraft, particularly during storms., 0
Both sides have remained resolute over the past decade, with
Cape Wind tenaciously pursuing the permitting process and the
Alliance attempting to block the project at every opportunity.
From a political standpoint, project opponents were able to
stall the permitting process at several turns. The fees for lobbying costs alone have reached seven figures. 8 1 At the state level,
the Energy Facilities Siting Board initially dragged its feet in issuing approval to the project, but it later approved the project
over the Cape Cod Commission's denial of the permit.8 2 At the
national level, congressional allies proposed amendments to various bills involving energy, defense, and the Coast Guard that,
if passed, would be problematic for Cape Wind. Though unsuccessful, the proposals "added great cost and uncertainty to the
project."8 3 Additionally, in 2005, Cape Wind suffered another
setback with the passage of the Energy Policy Act, which resulted
in a new permitting process.8 4 Subsequently, a lengthy dispute
ensued over whether the project could be blocked under the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), causing further delays in the quest to obtain the permits and, ultimately, the
lease.85
Perhaps one of the most effective delay tactics used by the
Alliance has been their dogged pursuit of litigation to block the
project's construction. In 2010 alone, the Alliance spent an estimated $500,000 in legal fees. 86 After the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) granted a conditional permit in 2001 allowing Cape Wind to construct a data tower in Horseshoe
Shoals, the Alliance sued in federal court on the grounds that
the Corps either lacked authority to issue the permit or that it
Safety, ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTUCKET SOUND, http://www.saveoursound.org/
cape-wind-threats/publicsafety/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
79 See Schulz, supra note 2, at 423.
80 Id. at 423-24.
81 See Eilperin, supra note 66 (stating that lobbying fees have cost "millions").
82 See Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 15, at 206-08.
83 Id. at 203-04.
84 See id. at 205-06.
85 Id. at 208-11.
86 See Rezendes, supra note 69.
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acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the permit.87
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Corps and Cape Wind, and the First Circuit affirmed.88 But over
three years had passed from the initial apjlication for the permit until the appellate court issued its opinion."9
The Alliance repeatedly challenged the project in state courts.
In 2005, the same year the First Circuit issued its opinion, Cape
Wind obtained a conditional permit from the Energy Facilities
Siting Board for the transmission lines that would serve as the
link between the offshore wind farm and the onshore power
grid. 0 The Alliance unsuccessfully turned to the state courts to
vacate the board's decision, which was upheld in 2006.91 The
next year, the Alliance and others brought additional litigation
seeking to overturn another decision of the siting board and
have an environmental regulation invalidated. 2 But in 2010,
the state's highest court again affirmed the board's decision and
found the environmental regulation valid.9" The Alliance attacked the project in court on multiple fronts simultaneously.
For example, in 2007, the Alliance sought to have the Final Environmental Impact Report certificate issued by the state secretary
of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs declared arbitrary and capricious.9 4 However, the court issued a
judgment on the pleadings, finding that the Secretary did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the certificate and dismissed the complaint.9 5 In December 2011, the Alliance's challenges to the Department of Public Utilities also failed.96
87 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 398 F.3d
105, 107-08 (1st Cir. 2005).
88 Id. at 108.
89 See id.
90 Alliance II, 932 N.E.2d 787, 791 (Mass. 2010).
91 See Alliance 1, 858 N.E.2d 294, 298, 302 (Mass. 2006).
92 See Alliance II, 932 N.E.2d at 791.
9 Id. at 815.
94 Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. Cape Wind Assocs., LLC, 27 Mass. L. Rptr. 111,
2010 WL 2436837, at *1, *10 (Super. Ct. 2010) (the Alliance was one of the petitioners in this case).
95 Id. at *15.
96 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 959
N.E.2d 413, 417-18 (Mass. 2011) (upholding the Department of Public Utilities'
approval of a power purchasing contract between Cape Wind and National Grid);
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 959 N.E.2d 408,
409 (Mass. 2011) (affirming Department's denial of motion to reopen administrative record).
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To date, the Alliance's legal challenges to the Cape Wind project met success in court only in their challenge to the FAA's
determination that Cape Wind presented no aviation hazard.9 7
This case will be discussed in detail in Part III below. In that
instance, the court found the FAA's "no hazard" decision arbitrary and capricious.98 Because findings of arbitrary and capricious decisions can be corrected by administrative agencies, 99
this may be just a passing legal victory for the Alliance. However, the Alliance has at least one other lawsuit in the works. 100
In June 2010, the Alliance joined with others in filing suit
against the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM), the DOI, and the Fish and Wildlife Service for granting approval to Cape Wind to move forward with construction of
the wind farm, claiming that the decision violated environmental laws and harmed wildlife.' 1
While some tout Cape Wind's ability to move beyond these
hurdles as an ultimate success, 10 2 such success did not come
without cost or considerable delay to any return on investment
from the project. Even in early 2012, the prospects of constructing and operating Cape Wind looked grim.10 3 In fact, the ability
to delay a project over so many years has been viewed, from
other vantage points, as a success; 104 driving up overall project
97

Barnstable I, 659 F.3d 28, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

98 Id. at 34.

99 See, e.g., id. at 36 ("The FAA may ultimately find the risk of these dangers to
be modest."); see also Press Release, Cape Wind, Cape Wind Statement on Court
of Appeals Opinion Regarding the FAA (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.
capewind.org/news1216.htm [hereinafter Cape Wind Press Release] (noting
their expectation that a further explanation of the FAA's "no hazard" determination will allow the project to move forward).
100 See Compl. at 1, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Bromwich, No.
1:10CV01067, (D.D.C. June 25, 2010), available at http://www.marinelog.com/
PDF/capewindcomplaint.pdf (The Alliance is listed among the plaintiffs in this
lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the DOI and others for
authorizing the Cape Wind project on the grounds that it violates, inter alia,
environmental laws and will harm birds in the area).
101 See id.
102 See, e.g., Walter Brooks, Clean Power Now Passes into Histo'y, CAPE COD TODAY
(Dec. 22, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.capecodtoday.com/news/headlines/
2011/12/22/clean-power-now-passes-into-history (stating that "the fight seems to
have been all but won").
103 See Sean Corcoran, Sean Corcoran's Cape Wind Blog, WCAI (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.wgbh.org/wcai/cape-wind-blog.cfm (noting that the consultants
doubt Cape Wind will operate by mid-2015).
104 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 67 (quoting Audra Parker, President and CEO
of the Alliance, as saying, "Cape Wind has suffered serious setbacks this year...
Cape Wind is not going to be built").
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costs with numerous delays can ultimately kill a particular project. Neither the political delays nor. the legal delays to Cape
Wind bode well for the successful future development of other
offshore wind projects in the United States, as Cape Wind's
lengthy battle could discourage potential investors from investing in similar projects in other locations. Planned projects require private backing to succeed. 05 Other planned domestic
offshore wind farms"0 6 include the Mid-Atlantic Wind Park off
the Delaware coast, 10 7 Deepwater Wind in Rhode Island,"°8 and
Garden State Offshore in New Jersey, 10 9 among others. As of
December 2011, the future of the Mid-Atlantic Wind Park
looked bleak."0
D.

OFFSHORE WIND

FARMs

ACROSS THE WORLD

While the United States' attempts to get offshore wind off the
ground have been flailing over the past decade, other nations
have successfully implemented offshore wind projects. Some
credit the Kyoto ProtocolIII as one of the driving forces behind
the expansion of wind energy across the globe. 112 Currently, in
Europe, offshore wind farms operate in the United Kingdom,
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and
105SeeJon Hurdle, DissectingWhat Put Delaware'sOffshore Wind FarmPlan in Peril,
WDDE 91.1 FM (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.delawarefirst.org/20730-wind-farmdelaware-peril.
106 See Map of Offshore Wind Energy Activity in North America, supra note 4 (containing interactive map of planned and proposed wind farm projects).
107 See NRG Bluewater Wind & the Mid-Atlantic Wind Park, INDIAN RIVER GENERATING STATION, http://www.poweringde.com/news/in-news-bww.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
108See Scott DiSavino, Deepwater to Build First U.S. Offshore Wind Farm, REUTERS
(Oct. 13, 2011, 2:04 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/13/us-deepwater-wind-idUSTRE79COYC20111013.
109 See Garden State Offshore Energy Project Overview, DEEPWATER WIND, http://
dwwind.com/new-jersey/new-jersey-project-overview (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
110 See Hurdle, supra note 105.

I11See Kyoto Protocol, TIMES Topics-N.Y.

TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top-

ics/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/kyotoprotocol/index.html (last updated
Dec. 12, 2011) (explaining the Kyoto Protocol is a multi-national agreement
among many United Nations countries, includingJapan, Canada, Russia, Australia, and Europe made in 1997 in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States is not a party to the agreement, which is set to end in 2012).
112 See, e.g., Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing
Wind Power as an Alternative Energy Source in the United States: Creative and Comparative Solutions, 27 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 535, 541-42, 541 n.33 (2007) (noting that
the United States was not a party to this agreement that mandated reduced
greenhouse gas emissions).
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Belgium." 3 Additionally, China has launched an offshore wind
farm as well.' 14
As recently as 2007, two authors highlighted several similar
challenges to developing offshore wind projects in the United
States and in the United Kingdom." 5 Those similarities included lengthy approval processes, cumbersome regulatory
frameworks, environmental opposition, and cries of "NIMBY'
from the citizenry. 1 6 However, at that time, the United Kingdom had already begun restructuring its regulatory processes117
and including affected persons early on in the siting process. 18
By the close of 2010, the United Kingdom led the world in offshore wind energy production.'19 The success of the U.K. offshore wind development efforts is due, at least in part, to the
government's support in terms of both establishing clear renewable energy policies and committing financial resources to spur
0
2

development.1

A review of Cape Wind's history demonstrates the myriad issues involved in developing offshore wind. While offshore wind
powers electricity in several foreign countries, the United States
has yet to realize the goal of establishing offshore wind as a viable alternative energy source.' 2' Commentators have proposed
numerous reasons for this failure. Part III will consider three
reasons: (1) the unwieldy regulatory structure for permitting offshore wind farms; (2) the FAA's role in exposing the Cape Wind
113

EU Offshore, supra note 22.

PR China, supra note 3 (noting the Shanghai Donghai Bridge Offshore
Wind Farm became operational in 2010); see also China Launches Offshore Wind
Farm, UPI.coM (Jan. 5, 2012), http://wvw.upi.com/Business-News/EnergyResources/2012/01/05/China-launches-offshore-wind-farm/UPI-349113257852
114

06/.

See Dinnell & Russ, supra note 112, at 572, 574.
Id. at 574. Note that NIMBY is an acronym for "not in my back yard," used
to describe outraged residents who oppose a project's siting in their neighborhood or community; it is not limited to wind farm sitings. Martin, supra note 42,
at 427.
115
116

117

118

Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.

119 See United Kingdom, GWEC, http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=135 (last
visited Sept. 1, 2012).
120 Id. (crediting the United Kingdom's Renewables Obligation-a financial
instrument-with propelling growth in the industry for nearly a decade, and citing the June 2010 Annual Energy Statement as an example of one factor that
promotes private investment).
121 Xiaojing Sun et al., The Current State of Offshore Wind Energy Technology Development, 41 ENERGY 298, 299 (2012), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0360544212001685.
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project to successful legal challenge; and (3) the lack of a comprehensive aviation policy for wind turbines similar to that of
the FAA's British counterpart, the CAA.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
As there are no operational offshore wind farms in the United
States, the permitting process for offshore wind farms remains
largely untested from commencement to completion. 122 Developers of offshore projects have found the permitting process,
particularly at the federal level, exasperating. 123 Further, each
decision point requiring agency approval offers opponents an
additional opportunity to delay a project by either lobbying decision-makers or bringing costly litigation to challenge an
agency's decision.124

A.

REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR SITING
OFFSHORE WIND

FARMs

The DOI is responsible for our nation's energy supply.'2 5 The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 vests authority over the permitting
process for offshore wind development with the Secretary of the
Interior. 126 Much has been written on the cumbersome and
complex process offshore wind farm developers face to obtain
the permits necessary to site and construct their facilities.'2 7 For

one, the sum of infrastructure necessary to take energy from a
turbine and connect it to the power grid physically crosses federal, state, and local territories 128 and thus is subject to each ju-

risdiction.12 9 In response to the challenges faced by Cape Wind,
Interior Secretary Salazar implemented the "Smart from the

122 See F.B. VAN CLEVE & A.E. COPPING, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY PERMITTING: A SURVEY OF U.S. PROJECT DEVELOPERS 3.4 (Nov. 2010), avail-

able at http://vw.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical-reports/
PNNL-20024.pdf ("Developers noted that clear instructions from agencies were
often lacking as many state or federal agencies are developing a permitting process at the same time they are trying to permit the first wave of projects.").
123 Id. ("Frustration with the federal permitting process was common to all respondents working at the federal level.").
124 Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 15, at 203-04, 211.
125 Mission Statement, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/whowe
are/Mission-Statement.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
337
126 See 43 U.S.C. § 1
(p)(1) (2006).
127 See, e.g.,
Schroeder, supra note 15, 1642-48; Dinnell & Russ, supra note 112,
at 555-65; Jeremy Firestone et al., Regulating Offshore Wind Power and Aquaculture:
Messages From Land and Sea, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 78-87 (2004).
128 See Schroeder, supra note 15, at 1642-43.
129 Rigano, supra note 14, at 224.
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Start" initiative near the end of 2010 to improve and streamline
offshore wind farm siting and development on the Atlantic
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 3L0 The initiative vested exclusive jurisdiction in managing wind projects on the OCS with the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and EnHowever,
forcement (BOEMRE), which is under the DOI.'
the BOEMRE was subsequently reorganized in 2011 into the BuBureau of
reau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and13 the
2
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).
The BOEM now maintains oversight of the offshore renewaThe leases, grants, and permits (both
ble energy program.'
for construction and operation) for wind farms on the OCS fall
within the purview of the BOEM.' 34 However, although the
BOEM has responsibility for the OCS, any development project
must comply with a myriad of federal laws. 135 The Energy Policy
Act of 2005, while establishing the framework for leasing and
permitting offshore wind energy projects on the OCS, does not
provide the entire picture for the permitting process because it
does not supersede existing federal laws that were designed 1 to
36
protect our natural, environmental, and historic resources.
Due to their locations, many potential offshore wind farms must
comply with all preexisting, applicable laws, such as the National
Environmental Protections Act (NEPA), 37 the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA),' 3 a which exemplifies the interplay
130

U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR &

U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRIC., NEW ENERGY FRONTIER:

36 (May 2011), available at
http://vv.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/upload/NewEnergyFrontier050511.pdf.
131 Id.
132 See The Reorganization of the Former MMS, BSEE, http://www.bsee.gov/AboutBSEE/Reorganization/Reorganization.aspx (last visited on Sept. 1, 2012).
133 See BuREAu OF SAFETY & ENVrL. ENFORCEMENT, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ASSIGNBALANCING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS

MENT OF REGULATIONS BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT AND
OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, subch. B, pt. 285,
available at http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/ChartBSEEBOEMRegulatoryAuthorities.pdf.
134 See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., RENEWABLE ENERGY ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF FACT SHEET 2, available at http://vww.boem.gov/uploaded
Files/Fact%20Sheet%20BOEM%20Renewable%20Energy.pdf.
135 See BOEM Governing Statutes, BOEM, http://www.boem.gov/Regulations/
BOEM-Governing-Statutes.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (identifying a sampling
of federal laws with which the BOEM must ensure compliance).
136See Peter J. Schaumberg & Angela F. Colamaria, Siting Renewable Energy
Projects on the Outer ContinentalShelf Spin, Baby, Spin!, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 624, 656 (2009).
137 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2006).
138 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (2006).
THE BUREAU
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between state and federal jurisdiction, and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act,13 9 among others.1' Under federal jurisdiction,
there are more than twenty separate laws and executive orders
with which a potential offshore wind farm must comply. 4 ' This
means the BOEM is responsible for coordinating review of compliance with numerous federal agencies, including the Council
on Environmental Control, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the EPA, the Corps, the U.S.
Coast Guard, the National Park Service, the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the FAA. 14 2 And that is only at the federal level.
States, which retain authority over the lines connecting the turbines to the power grid, have their own sets of laws, which may
or may not mirror federal laws and add to the complexity of the
permitting process. 143 Each law involved, whether local, state, or
federal, adds another hurdle' 44 over which a project may potentially stumble, taking a developer out of the race to provide offshore wind energy.
Given the height of offshore wind turbines, one federally-governed area with which construction projects must comply is aviation safety. 14 5 Developers must, under federal law, notify the
FAA of construction projects that may affect the navigable airspace. 46 The FAA then reviews construction projects that may
obstruct or interfere with the navigable airspace, navigation
equipment, or facilities, determines the projects' impact on air
139 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2006).
140 For a straightforward discussion of the regulatory framework faced by U.S.
offshore wind projects, see ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WIND ENERGY:
OFFSHORE PERMITTING (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://cnie.org/nle/crsreports/ lOSep/R40175.pdf.
141 For a complete listing of the applicable federal laws and a brief description

of each in a table format, see NEw ENERGY FRONTIER: BALANCING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 130, app. 5, at 119-22.
142 Id. (The table in Appendix 5 contains a listing of the laws and the corresponding agency or office responsible for its oversight.).
143 For a presentation of state law issues involved in the permitting of Cape
Wind, see Schroeder, supra note 15, at 1653-57.
144 See, e.g., supra Part II (describing the litigation history of Cape Wind).
While Cape Wind may be an extreme example of a litigious battle waged between
developers and opponents, it demonstrates one possible path where both sides
have deep pockets and determination. See id.
145 See 49 U.S.C. § 44718 (2006); 14 C.F.R. § 77.9 (2011).

146 See 14 C.F.R. § 77.9.
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safety and navigation, and issues a report of its findings. 147
Before 2011, two legal scholars had identified the FAA determination as a potential target wind farm opponents could use to
defeat such projects. 148 The Alliance pursued that route, successfully grounding (at least temporarily) the Cape Wind project
in 2011.149

B.

BARNSTABLE

II: THE

CASE THAT GROUNDED CAPE WIND

In BarnstableII, the Alliance and others challenged the FAA's
determination that the Cape Wind project presented no hazard
to aviation as arbitrary and capricious for failing to follow its
own regulations. 150 In response, the FAA argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their suit and that the FAA's "no
hazard" determination was sound.' 5' The court agreed with the
plaintiffs. 152
Standing to bring a lawsuit requires that the plaintiff show injury, causation, and redressability.1'13 In Barnstable II, the FAA
challenged only causation and redressability; injury was undisputed. 154 To prevail, the Alliance and the town of Barnstable
were required to show the connection between the injury and
the FAA's action (causation), and that prevailing on the merits
of the case would rectify their injury (redressability). 55 The
FAA's argument hinged on the fact that the DOI, rather than
the FAA, had the ultimate responsibility for granting the lease
for the Cape Wind project. 56 The court, however, rejected this
technicality, finding that if the FAA indeed determined that the
wind turbines posed a safety hazard, the DOI would withhold
remethe lease either indefinitely or until the safety issues were
5
died, thus redressing the plaintiffs' potential injury.1 1
See 49 U.S.C. § 44718(1) (b), (2).
See Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind
Law, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 198 (2010) (stating that "fighting the
FAA permits required for wind farms is one more way opponents may try to fight
or stall the installation of wind farms").
149 See Barnstable II, 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
147

148

150

Id. at 31.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153 Id.
154 Id.
155

Id.

156 Id. at 31-32.
157 Id. at 32.
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The court found two key factors supporting redressability in
this case: the statutory grant of authority the DOI has for issuing
the lease and the lease language itself. 158 The DOI has authority
to grant leases on the OCS under 43 U.S.C. § 1337.' 51 However,
the statute requires the DOI to consider safety before issuing
any lease. 160 Further, the court heavily relied on the language
the DOI had written into the wind farm lease that required
Cape Wind's compliance with any safety mitigation requirements the FAA imposed in its report.6

The court rejected the FAA's argument that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the "no hazard" determination because the determination was non-binding on the DOI's ultimate
decision to grant the lease. 6 ' In so doing, the court relied heavily on National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Manson, 6 ' a case in
which the court found standing despite the non-binding nature
of the DOI's opinion because the DOI's opinion would considerably impact the state of Montana's decision as to whether the
project in question could commence.164 In this case, because
the court deemed it likely that a FAA finding of immitigable hazard would lead the DOI to withhold the lease, the court held
that the petitioners had standing to bring the lawsuit.' 65
With the issue of standing decided, the court turned to the
question of whether the FAA's determination was arbitrary and
capricious because it violated its own guidelines.' 66 The internal
guidelines at the heart of the issue in this case were the FAA's
"Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters" (FAA Procedures). 167 Chapters 6 and 7 of the FAA Procedures address FAA
obstruction studies and their resulting determinations, respectively. 168 The FAA based its "no hazard" determination on the
158 See

id.

151 See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
3 7
4
160 43 U.S.C. § 1 3 (p)( ).

161Barnstable 1, 659 F.3d at 32.
162 See id. at 33.
163 414 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2005).
164 Id. at 6-7.
165 Barnstable I, 659 F.3d at 31, 34.
166 Id. at 34.
167 Id.; see FAA, ORDER No. JO 7400.G2, PROCEDURES FOR HALXNDLING AIRSPACE
MATrERS (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7400.2G.pdf [hereinafter FAA PROCEDURES]. Note that the procedural guidelines were subsequently amended in May, 2011 and are available at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/AIR.pdf. T'he changes apply to air traffic organizations and thus do not impact the analysis in this article.
168 FAA PROCEDURES, supra note 167, at ch. 6-7.
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fact that the proposed turbines would not exceed the 500-foot
height limitation whereby a structure is deemed to have an adverse effect on Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations. 6 ' While
this was a correct interpretation of one provision of the FAA
Procedures, the court found that the FAA failed to consider
other relevant provisions."1 Specifically, the court criticized the
FAA's failure to analyze record evidence of potential harmful
impacts on VFR navigation, including the number of flights in
the region that fly below an altitude of 1,000 feet, the resulting
distance separating the aircraft from the turbines, and the implications of the FAA's weather compression studies. 7 ' The court
real issues
scathingly accused the FAA of "catapult[ing] over the
72
handbook."'
its
by
required
work
analytical
the
and
Cape Wind opponents may declare the court's decision to vacate the FAA determination 73 a victory. However, the victory is
anything but permanent. 7" The court left room for the FAA to
declare that the project presents no hazard when it stated:
The FAA may ultimately find the risk of these dangers to be modest, but we cannot meaningfully review any such prediction because the FAA cut the process short in reliance on a misreading
far as we can tell, never calculated
of its handbook and thus, 1as
75
the risks in the first place.

It follows then, from the court's opinion,17 6 that so long as the
FAA conducts the airspace obstruction analysis according to its
own procedures and adequately explains its results, it is free to
determine that the Cape Wind project presents either no hazard
or one that can be mitigated using specified techniques.
Although BarnstableIlwas the first refusal of the courts to uphold a siting decision for an offshore wind farm project, the FAA
was no stranger to the court declaring one of its decisions arbitrary and capricious in connection to onshore wind farms. 1 77 In
Clark County, Nevada v. FAA, the county took issue with the FAA's
Barnstable II, 659 F.3d at 34-35.
Id. at 35 (noting the turbines must be studied for possible harms occurring
under procedures 6-3-3(a)-(f)).
171 Id. at 35-36.
172 Id. at 36.
173 Id.
174 See id. (declaring the uncertainty of whether following the handbook will
result in a final hazard determination or not).
175 Id.
169
170

176See

id.

See Clark Cnty., Nev. v. FAA, 522 F.3d 437, 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the FAA determination under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
177
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"does not exceed" determination in connection with a proposed
eighty-three turbine wind farm that would be located near a
planned airport.1 7 8 In that case, the county claimed the FAA
violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) because it
failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its determinations regarding the proposed wind farm. 179 The court agreed. 8 0

The proposed turbines in that case had an estimated height
of 400 feet, triggering notification of potential airspace obstruction and subsequent FAA analysis of the project.'8 1 The FAA
Procedures also drove the study in that case.' 82 Specifically, the
FAA decided that "each turbine 'does not exceed [the Subpart
C] obstruction standards, does not have substantial adverse
physical or electromagnetic interference effect upon navigable
airspace or air navigation facilities, and would not be a hazard to
air navigation."" 8 3 The court reviewed the FAA decision under
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a deferential
standard that determines only whether the administrative
and considered
agency engaged in reasoned decision making,
18 4
record.
the
in
factors
relevant
all of the
The court found that the FAA failed to engage in reasoned
decision making.' 85 Instead, in reviewing the FAA's report and
the record, the court found that the evidence conflicted with
the FAA's conclusions. 186 In deciding the case, the court relied
on the FAA's own report, the FAA Procedural Handbook, and a
consultant's impact study."8 7 The FAA's own report and the
consultant's study both indicated the project presented potenBecause the FAA failed to offer
tial hazards and interference.'
a reasoned explanation that addressed these potential hazards,
Id. at 438-40.
179 Id. at 438-39.
180 Id. at 439.
181 Id. at 438-39. Note that the statute (49 U.S.C. § 44718(b)) and the regulation (14 C.F.R. § 77) are the same statutory mandates that triggered notification
of, and study by, the FAA in the Cape Wind project.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 439-40.
184 Id. at 441.
185 Id. at 442.
186 Id. at 441-42 (stating that "the only evidence in the record available to
[the] [c]ourt actually support[ed] the opposite conclusions-that the turbines
both would exceed the FAA's obstruction standards and would interfere with radar systems at the new airport").
187 Id. at 442.
178

188

Id.
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the court found89 for the plaintiffs and vacated the FAA's
determinations.
C.

THE

UNITED KINGDOM'S AVIATION

POLICY

FOR WIND TURBINES

The CAA is the FAA's counterpart in the United Kingdom. 90
In July 2006, the CAA published the first edition of its "CAA
Policy and Guidelines on Wind Turbines" (CAA Policy)."" The
FAA has no similar policy available or easily accessible to project
stakeholders. The CAA Policy reflects an understanding that
aviation safety in wind farm development must be considered to
successfully launch projects. 9 2 The flexible document incorporates updates from interested parties every other year. 9 3 The
comprehensive CAA Policy puts key information in stakeholders' hands by providing detailed explanations of the following:
(1) the role of the CAA; (2) the effects of wind turbines on aviation, including the resulting safety issues and range of mitigation options; and (3) the planning process to develop wind
turbines.194
The CAA drafted the CAA Policy to educate interested parties
about the aviation issues associated with wind turbines and to
"ensur[e] greater consistency in the consideration of the potential impact of proposed wind turbine developments."' 9 5 The
guide clearly spells out the CAA's policy on wind energy and
how it fits into the United Kingdom's overall energy goals, yet it
recognizes that within the policy and guidelines each project
must be evaluated on an individual basis.' 96 The CAA Policy
also discusses the interaction of a project's review with other related laws.' 97 Chapter 2 of the CAA Policy discusses in detail
how wind turbines affect aviation, including their impacts on
primary and secondary radar systems, navigation and communiat 443.
About the CAA, CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=286 (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (stating that the CAA is responsible for air safety and regulation, among other things).
191 CAP 764: CAA POLICY AND GUIDELINES ON WIND TURBINES, supra note 17, at
Revision History p. 1.
1.3-1.6.
192 See id. Forward p. 1,
193 Id. Forward p. 2,
4.1.
189 Id.
190 See

194
'95
196

197

See id. Contents pp. 1-2.
Id. Forward, p. 2 .
Id. ch. 1, p. 1 .
See, e.g., id. ch. 1, p. 1,

4.1, ch. 3, p. 2,

5.1-5.2.
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cation systems, air traffic services, and helicopter operations.19
Additionally, the chapter presents information regarding the cumulative effects on airports, the economic impacts on airports,
turbulence problems, and the impacts on both the military and
emergency response units.'99
By clearly describing the potential aviation safety problems
wind turbines present, Chapter 2 sets the stage for the remainder of the document.2z° Chapter 3 builds on this foundation by
discussing official and unofficial safeguarding, which authorizes
local airport operations managers to assess proposed development projects in their area for possible adverse impacts.20 '
Chapter 4 then identifies and describes the range of mitigation
techniques available to address potential aviation safety hazards
presented by wind farms. 2
The final chapter describes, in detail, the entire wind farm
planning process as it relates to aviation safety compliance.2(3
Historically, the CAA offered pre-planning consultation services
to wind farm developers; 2"4 however, though these services have
ceased, the CAA Policy offers guidelines and considerations,
such as factors that would more heavily impact aircraft operations, to aid developers in their own pre-planning efforts.20 5
The remainder of the chapter provides an overview of the formal planning process for wind farm assessment and approval,
and discusses how the CAA fits into the process. 0 6
This section considered the current state of the law concerning offshore wind permitting. The statutory framework remains
unwieldy. The FAA has failed to follow its own internal guidelines and, in the process, has left the Cape Wind project exposed as easy prey for its highly litigious opponents.20 7 And

further, in the past decade, the FAA has failed to establish an
easily accessible, succinct aviation policy on wind turbines. The
current state of affairs identifies three areas on which the fed198 See id. ch. 2, pp. 1-5.

199 Id. ch. 2, pp. 6-10.
200 Id.
201 See
202 See
203 See
204 See

ch. 2.
id. ch. 3, p. 1.
id. ch. 4.
id. ch. 5.

206 Id.

ch. 5, pp. 3-6.

id. ch. 5, 1.1 (noting that as of December 25, 2010, the CAA no longer
offers pre-planning consultation, and developers are now expected to conduct
the assessment).
205 See id. ch. 5, pp. 1-2, tbl. 1
1.1-1.2.
207 Barnstable II, 659 F.3d 28, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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eral government should focus to successfully launch future
projects.
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS

"SMART FROM THE START": AN IMPROVEMENT

THAT NEEDS FINE-TUNING

The Cape Wind fiasco demonstrates that the failure over the
past decade to successfully get one U.S. offshore wind project on
the path to construction goes beyond a complex regulatory
scheme in which the right hand of the federal government is
unaware of what the left hand is doing. With the sheer number
of laws and different agencies involved, the federal process is
more aptly analogized to a jellyfish with numerous tentacles
gone awry, each on their own trajectory, preventing the system
from moving towards its stated goal. A decade later, the permitting process still reeks of a piecemeal regulatory scheme, rather
than a cohesive process in line with an aggressive renewable energy goal that purports to make offshore wind energy a priority.
"Smart from the Start" is a step toward bringing order to the
chaos, but it has not gone far enough. The BOEM, the lead
agency ultimately responsible for issuing the requisite leases and
permits,2 ° 8 can do more in terms of agency coordination and
provision of information to stakeholders.
The DOI, in its May 2011 joint report to Congress with the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, recognized that the FAA plays a
role in the nation's quest to deliver clean energy via wind
farms.2 °9 With the exception of Appendix 5, which presents the
2 10
regulatory scheme for offshore wind farms in table format,
the joint report does not specifically discuss the FAA's role in
the offshore wind regulatory framework. 2 11 Rather, in its section
on offshore wind, the report emphasizes the requisite compliance with environmental legislation that projects need for approval of a BOEM lease on the OCS. 2 12 But the report merely
lumps together "other federal agencies" and "other reviews" that
208

See

RENEWABLE ENERGY ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF FACT SHEET,

supra note 134, at 2.
209 See, e.g., NEW ENERGY

FRONTIER: BALANCING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON FED-

supra note 130, at 55, 122, 127.
See id. at 119-22.

ERAL LANDS,
210

See id. at 35-40 (discussing the current regulatory scheme to establish offind projects on the OCS).
212 See id. (Note the emphasis of CZMA, NEPA, and the wildlife-related environmental acts listed on the chart on page 37, contrasted with the absence of the
211

shore
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are not part of the environmental review process and gives them
little attention.21 3 The absence of further discussion of other
agencies, such as the FAA, in the section of the report devoted
to the offshore wind permitting process may be due to the untested nature of the process. Or, it could indicate a minimization of the laws and agency involvement outside of the "major"
environmental impact studies.
One could look by analogy to the report's description of the
onshore permitting process to get a sense of the DOI's view of
where the FAA fits into the overall scheme.21 4 The DOI does
mention the FAA in that discussion.215 However, this document
focuses not on the FAA's role in the overall permitting process,
but rather on "preserv[ing the] night sky integrity" by developing safety warning systems that are an alternative to the flashing
lights currently required on objects that protrude more than
200 feet in the air.2 16 Focusing on only those agencies perceived
to be the key players-those responsible for the various environmental reviews-is shortsighted. What good is it if a project
passes all the "major" hurdles by complying with key legislation,
like NEPA and CZMA, but stumbles over relatively "minor" steps
like NHPA 217 or falls when it undergoes FAA review? 218 Still, after a decade of attempts to bring order and structure to the offshore wind farm siting process at the federal level, "Smart from
the Start" falls short of coherent, comprehensive planning. In
light of the D.C. Circuit's decision in BarnstableII to vacate the
FAA's "no hazard" determination on the Cape Wind project,2" 9
failure to consider the FAA's role in approving a structure of
this height is folly.
One article concerning the 2011 offshore wind conference
stated, "As [Secretary] Salazar pointed out, this is an industry
FAA, which can be inferred to be included in the "national stakeholders," "federal agencies," and those who produce "other reviews" listed on the same chart.).
213 See id.
214 See id. at 35-69.
215 Id. at 55.
216 Id. at 55, 128 (noting that current regulations require flashing lights at
night on structures exceeding a height requirement to warn pilots flying at low
altitudes).
217 See Kimmell & Stalenhoef, supra note 15, at 208, 223-24 (reporting that the
dispute over a historic preservation review delayed the project by a year and a
half).
218 See supra Part III(B) (discussing the court's decision in Barnstable 1).
219 See id.
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that does not really exist yet. ' 220 On its face, that statement is
either intellectually dishonest or grossly ethnocentric. 22'

It is

true that no such industry has succeeded in the United States,
but the industry does exist-in fact it "really exist[s] ,"222 just not
in U.S. territory. The reality is that other nations have succeeded in launching this industry 2 23 where the United States has
failed, repeatedly. And there is surely something to be learned
from others' success.
At a minimum, the DOI, and the BOEM specifically, should
provide a clear understanding of the role that each federal
agency potentially plays in the permitting process. While initially the focus was on the necessary environmental reviews of
the project, the DOI should now revise its documentation of the
offshore wind permitting process. The revisions should focus
on the other reviews-including both the FAA safety review and
determination, and the historic preservation review processesnecessary to obtain the requisite permits before construction
can commence. The BOEM, as the lead coordinating agency,
should make this information available and easily accessible to
all stakeholders. While the BOEM should be responsible for
spearheading the planning, coordination, and provision of information to stakeholders concerning the permitting process,
individual agencies must be individually accountable for their
roles in the permitting process.

Wald, supra note 23 (referring to the offshore wind industry).
See id. Perhaps the author meant that no offshore wind industry has been
established in the United States. However, to state that the industry itself does
not really exist either refuses to recognize others' achievements because we have
failed where they have succeeded, or it implies that an industry has not really
"arrived" unless it has been established in the United States.
222 See, e.g., Lessons Learned on Offshore Wind-And the Next Steps, GWEC (Jan. 30,
2008), http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=77&L=0&tx ttnews[backPid]=76&txttnews [pointer]= 1 &txjttnews [tt-news] =I 28&cHash=f2b6ab8687 (noting that
even by October 2007 Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom all
had successfully established operational offshore wind farms). See also EU Offshore, supranote 22 (documenting that as of 2010, EU offshore wind capacity was
nearly 3,000 MW and that eight of the nine wind farms that had been constructed that year alone were "fully grid connected").
223 United Kingdom, supra note 119 (As of 2010, "[w]ith 1,341 MW of installed
capacity offshore, the UK continue[d] to be the world's leading offshore wind
market. A further 1,154 MW of offshore capacity are under construction, the
majority of which may come online as early as 2011. A milestone in 2010 was the
opening of Thanet, the world's largest offshore wind farm .... ").
220
221
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LESSONS (THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN) LEARNED FROM THE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FAA DETERMINATIONS
CONCERNING WIND FARMS

Whereas the important factor in real estate is "location, location, location," judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard boils down to "explanation, explanation,
explanation." An agency's informal decision making is reviewed
under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard
of review.2 24 To withstand judicial scrutiny, an agency must consider the relevant factors and provide a reasoned explanation
for its decision.125 But a lack of reasoned decision making-no
explanation-results in remand with direction for the agency to
adequately explain its decision.2 2 6
Given the litigious nature of the Alliance, the FAA should
have known that any determination it made concerning Cape
Wind would be closely scrutinized. The Alliance endeavors to
prevent Cape Wind from realization, whether by refusal of permits or abandonment of the project by investors. The FAA
played right into the Alliance's plan. And, in light of the court's
decision in Clark County,227 the FAA is without excuse for failing
to adequately explain why Cape Wind presents no hazard to aviation safety.
Despite the fact that the wind farm at issue in the earlier case
was onshore, while the 2011 case concerned an offshore facility,228 there were several similarities between the two cases. Both
cases involved FAA review of wind turbines. 2 29 Whether onshore
or offshore, the FAA should have studied the reasons for the
court's rejection of its safety determinations on other wind farm
projects. Since the court struck down a prior FAA determination because the FAA offered an inadequate explanation, the
FAA was on notice in 2008 that any future determinations must
be adequately explained. 23 0

Both cases had vocal factions who

vehemently opposed the construction of the proposed wind
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a) (2006); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971).
225 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
226 Id. at 57.
227 See Clark Cnty., Nev. v. FAA, 522 F.3d 437, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
228 BarnstableIl, 659 F.3d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 438.
229 Barnstable II, 659 F.3d at 30; Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 438.
230 Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 443.
224
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farms in their communities.231 In 2008, opponents challenged
the FAA's safety determination in court to ground that project.2 1 2 The FAA should have also expected a challenge to its
safety determination concerning Cape Wind and should have
painstakingly explained its decision. And, in both cases, the
FAA had been involved previously in the projects and should
have been intimately aware of the strength of the opposition.233
Under existing federal regulations, the height of wind turbines 234 for commercial wind farms will trigger FAA review of
any proposed offshore wind project. 2 35 Future FAA reviews of

proposed offshore wind farms must consider every way a proposed project could adversely affect air navigation and aviation
safety. Thorough analysis of all the factors outlined in the handbook, consideration of all safety issues raised by stakeholders,
and an explanation of how the FAA arrives at its ultimate determination, including any necessary mitigation measures, should
be part and parcel of all future FAA reviews of offshore wind
farms.
The FAA's failure to follow its own guidelines after an adverse
judicial review in 2008 indicates deficiencies concerning the
steps necessary to produce a solid analysis and an explanation
that can withstand judicial scrutiny. Going forward, the FAA
should explore where the breakdown has occurred in past reviews-whether it was due to a lack of training, shoddy analysis,
or failure to effectively communicate the results of a study. Selfreview would help the FAA produce stronger studies, reduce delays due to litigation and judicial vacation of its findings, and
ultimately facilitate the permitting process. Intentional planning can help the FAA facilitate the process of meeting aviation
safety goals by screening out projects that truly pose an immitiId. at 440; Barnstable II, 659 F.3d at 31.
Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 438-39.
233 In Clark County, the FAA had been involved with Clark County's planning
process to site a new airport before the wind farm was even proposed in the same
vicinity. Clark Cnty., 522 F.3d at 438. After the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the FAA "no hazard" determinations in October, Cape Wind released a
statement that, "The FAA has reviewed Cape Wind for eight years and repeatedly
determined that Cape Wind did not pose a hazard to air navigation." Cape Wind
Press Release, supra note 99.
234 See Smith & Diffen, supranote 148, at 200 (noting the height of the turbines
is approximately 262 feet, and fully assembled, the blades extend 400 feet above
ground level).
235 14 C.F.R. § 77.9(a) (2011) (mandating that a project that involves "[a]ny
construction or alteration that is more than 200 ft." requires a notice filing with
the FAA).
231
232
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gable hazard, facilitating mitigation techniques where appropriate, and streamlining the permitting process for those projects
that pose no hazard.
C.

LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM: AVIATION SAFETY
REVIEW IN THE BROADER REGULATORY SCHEME

A comparison of the FAA's website containing information relating to wind farm siting and the CAA's website concerning
wind energy shows that the CAA is more proactive in making
such information available to stakeholders. For example, the
FAA has a "Wind Turbine FAQs" section on its website.2" 6 The
CAA has a page devoted to wind farms under its airspace policy
tab, and the page contains hot links to related documents, including the CAA's Policy on Wind Turbines. 23 71 In contrast to
the United Kingdom's well-developed policy document, 238 the
FAA's "Wind Turbine FAQs" section contains twenty-one questions and answers to guide prospective project developers
through the process of the FAA obstruction evaluation and resulting determination.239 The FAA should consider facilitating
communication with project stakeholders by making available
the relevant information concerning the FAA's role in the offshore permitting process.
The FAA should develop a wind turbine policy document
modeled after the CAA Policy to aid in the obstruction review of
wind turbines and to provide valuable information to stakeholders in an efficient manner. The beauty of the CAA Policy is that
it contains a wealth of information in one relatively concise document.2 0 An FAA policy statement modeled after the CAA Policy could extract from the FAA Procedures 241 only those
Wind Turbine FAQs, FAA, https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/external/searchAction.jsp?action=showWindTurbineFAQs (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
236
237

See Windfarms: Wind Turbines and Aviation Interests, CIVIL AVIATION AUTHOR-

rTV, http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=1959
238 See supra Part 111(C) (describing in detail the

(last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
comprehensive nature of the

CAA Policy).
239 See Wind Turbine FAQs, supra note 236.
240 Note, the CAA Policy is only sixty-four pages long, including several blank
pages inserted as section breaks between the chapters. See CAP 764: CAA POLICY
AND GUIDELINES ON WIND TURBINES, supra note 17. Thus, the policy stands in
sharp contrast with the reams of paper one often associates with government
policies and reports. See, e.g., Drash, supranote 60 (referencing a 4,000-page government study of Cape Wind as typical of numerous assessments of the project).
See also FAA PROCEDURES, supra note 167 (a 345-page document).
241 See FAA PROCEDURES, supra note 167.
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procedures relevant to wind turbines. The FAA should establish
a clear policy regarding wind turbines, like the U.K. document,
that specifically ties in the "Smart from the Start" initiative and
facilitates national renewable energy goals. The FAA document
should be tailored to address the aviation safety and air navigation hazards that are encountered in the United States. Likewise, the FAA could explain the domestically approved and
available mitigation techniques for each corresponding safety
hazard or potential interference. Additionally, the FAA could
clearly explain the FAA obstruction study procedure, the process of issuing a final determination on a project, and how the
determination fits into the overall federal regulatory process for
issuing offshore wind permits and leases.
D.

CURRENT PERMITTING PROCESS: MAINTAINING
THE STATUS Quo

AT WHAT COST?

Maintaining the status quo in offshore wind permitting is unnecessarily costly and therefore unacceptable. To date, the goal
of establishing commercial offshore wind farms remains a goal
only. Yet millions of dollars have been invested in Cape Wind
alone with no result. Interior Secretary Salazar approved the
permit for Cape Wind in 2011,242 yet by the end of that year, the
project had failed to break ground. 24 3 The result is millions of
dollars spent with nothing to show for it. The nation has paid
the opportunity costs associated with not having that private capital available for other ventures that may have yielded results.
And Cape Wind's enormous costs and zero results will deter private investors from funding similar green energy projects going
forward. Additionally, the community bears the human cost resulting from neighbors battling each other for a decade and
counting.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a nation, the United States has made increasing the
amount of electricity we get from renewable energy sources, including clean energy, a priority over the next few decades. If
242 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Approval
of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf off Massachusetts (Apr.
28, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-Cape-Wind-Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-offMassachusetts.cfm.
243 See Barnstable II, 659 F.3d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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offshore wind energy is to be a viable source of renewable energy, the DOI must take a hard look at all of the players involved
in the permitting process and make sure that not only the "major" agencies involved in the environmental review process but
also the less-visible agencies, who review projects for adverse impacts, all do their part to facilitate the permitting process. This
comment has examined the role of the FAA in the offshore
wind permitting process and how its failure to follow its own
internal regulations has momentarily derailed the Cape Wind
project. In the future, the FAA and other federal agencies involved in reviewing plans for adverse impacts must, at a minimum, consider how their reviews fit into the overall regulatory
framework. The FAA should develop a policy document specific
to wind turbines. Additionally, the FAA must train their reviewers to follow the FAA's internal guidelines and clearly explain
both their obstruction study methodology and all resulting
safety determinations. Putting all the relevant information in
one source available to project stakeholders can help streamline
the review process, reduce costs of obtaining information and
complying with federal regulations, and facilitate communication between persons interested in a particular project.
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